Urban Water Scarcity in Sana\u27a, Yemen by Herzberg, Aliza
FOCUS  15
Faculty and Student Work
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Aliza Herzberg 
Anthropology/Geography major, International Development 
concentration, and City and Regional Planning minor, Cal Poly. 
This essay is based on Aliza Herberg's final paper for the CRP Department's Cities in a Global World 
taught by Dr. Laura Tate in the Winter quarter of 2018. Open to all majors, the class explores the social 
and economic implications of urbanization and the international political economy on global cities, such as 
authenticity, gentrification, migration, social and environmental justice, and urban security. Students also assess 
global challenges through specific case studies, such as the one discussed by Aliza in this essay. 
The world’s urban population is growing at an unprecedent-ed rate; one half of the world’s population is already living 
in urban areas (Emmerij ,1997, p. 104). Urban life often draws 
people from rural areas due to it’s “better quality and more 
choice in education, material comforts, medical care, employ-
ment opportunities, and self-expression. It [the urban setting] 
provides a wide variety of skills, services, cultures, delivery sys-
tems, and so on” (Emmerij 1997: 105). The benefts of the urban 
setting are especially attractive to impoverished rural dwell-
ers who aspire for a better quality of life. While the growth of 
megacities often benefts the respective national economy 
and incorporates the country into the global world system, 
there are many social and environmental consequences asso-
ciated with urban growth. 
Urban life and increasing urbanization shares and exacerbates 
its own host of social issues, including “poverty, housing, un-
employment and underemployment, slums, crime, drugs, 
and street children” (Emmerij, 1997, p. 105). These issues are a 
consequence of the “growing urban [economic] dualism and 
informalization,” a phenomenon that emerges with increas-
ing economic inequality, creating an inevitable divide among 
the powerful and wealthy elite and the impoverished masses. 
Poverty and marginalization are embedded as an inevitable 
aspect of the social structure of the megacity (Emmerij, 1997, 
p. 104). This paradox manifests itself in most urban spaces and 
is further intensifed in periphery countries due to the lack of 
social services that would mitigate inequality. 
Yemen’s geopolitical and economic circumstances put the 
country in a disadvantaged position in a highly contested re-
gion of the world, Southwest Asia and North Africa (also known 
as the Middle East). Yemen has one of the highest populations 
in the Middle East, yet it has the lowest Gross Domestic Prod-
uct in the entire region and lacks adequate infrastructure and 
political control to sustain the growing needs of the country. 
The country’s arid environmental conditions strain the avail-
able environmental resources, especially water, leading the 
entire region into an era of constant drought and insecurity. 
The constant arid climate is magnifed by climate changes and 
desertifcation, making freshwater access a constant challenge 
for Yemeni people. 
Urban areas are particularly vulnerable to water shortages be-
cause of high population density. Sana’a, Yemen’s capital and 
the densest urban area in the country, faces constant water 
scarcity and issues of poor management. The country has a rel-
atively weak central government system, preventing enforce-
ment of policy measures to aid in public water management 
(Hovden, 2015). Yemen’s inadequate and unsustainable water 
infrastructure, including the reliance on depleting groundwa-
ter aquifers and infltration of contaminated water, dramati-
cally contributes to Sana’a’s water insecurity. Social and politi-
cal conditions within Yemen, such as the localized social power 
structure, civil unrest and violence, and the national addiction 
to the water-intensive stimulant “Khat,” all further worsen the 
water scarcity and threaten the stability of the region. 
Yemen’s Social Organization 
Specifcally related to public water law and management in Ye-
men, responsibility and power is considered a region-specifc
issue due to the “tribal social structure” that shapes the political
landscape “based on the collective responsibility and account-
ability of tribal leaders (sheikhs) to their communities” (Al-Sa-
bahi & De Santis, 2016, p. 56). Experts in Yemen water manage-
ment fnd that this local “tribal” organization is an important
variable which may cause a group to either defy or accept
broader water management laws, further complicating eforts
towards political stabilization and achieving peace (Mis, 2015).
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This regional water organization is intertwined with traditional 
principles of the Islamic system, also known as ala’ala-fa-ala’ala, 
a principle that gives “upstream land senior irrigation rights 
over downstream land” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 3). This principle is 
applicable when managing fresh surface water, including riv-
ers, lakes, and streams. However, due to Yemen’s arid physical 
geography and climate, Yemen relies on groundwater aquifers 
for 70% of the water supply, in which cases ala’ala-fa-ala’ala 
would not apply (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015, p. 216). Groundwater 
is an equally distributed resource because it is below ground 
and any successful well can reach the aquifer, whereas sur-
face water makes access unequally distributed due to geog-
raphy proximity near the water source. “Islamic principles treat 
[groundwater] as a communal property with a possibility of 
private ownership under special circumstances,” according to 
Yemen water expert Mohamed Al-Hamdi’s dissertation titled 
“Competition for Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain, Ye-
men: A study of the incentives for urban and agricultural water 
use.” Spatial constraints regarding water access and distribu-
tion are reifed by the localized system of power and social 
structure, challenging any potential national policy reform re-
garding water management. 
The tribal social structure, grounded in the power of the sheikh,
is reifed as “people lose faith in government institutions” from
unstable national authority, control or services. Accordingly,
65% of Internally Displaced Persons within Yemen choose to
fnd safety or confict resolution through their local leader. When
international aid organizations intervene to provide resources or
Figure 1: Map of Yemen showing the front lines of the war. (by the
American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project as of 01/02/2018;
source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-22/who-
s-to-blame-for-pestilence-near-famine-in-yemen-quicktake) 
services to these displaced populations, these groups often rely
on the regional social structure through “approval of sheikhs” be-
fore intervening in the local communities (Alsabahi & Desantis,
2016). However, this can lead to an uneven distribution of need-
ed resources, as illuminated by a study undertaken by Oxfam
and published by the Yemen Community Engagement Working
Group. In the study, 48% of respondents felt that humanitarian
aid in Yemen was not reaching the most vulnerable populations.
Arguably the most vulnerable or marginalized populations, such
as the elderly, mentally disabled, or illiterate people, have dif-
culties accessing information about humanitarian assistance
and consequently accessing the direct assistance.
Identifying the most vulnerable groups in Yemeni society is 
even further complicated by continuous societal discrimi-
nation towards certain minority groups.These marginalized 
groups, which often do not belong to a more organized “tribe” 
or have a sheikh, are overlooked when aid organizations come 
into the country to ofer humanitarian assistance. Because 
these minorities often have no organizational leader or group, 
either due to their informality or institutional discrimination 
against them, they have no credible or informed representa-
tive to advocate for them while navigating the international 
aid process (Alsabahi & Desantis, 2016). This further exacer-
bates social inequality and prevents aid from reaching the 
most at-risk groups in Yemen. 
Yemen’s Civil War and Political Turmoil 
Similar to many other countries in the region, Yemen is facing 
an intense water crisis with efects magnifed by several politi-
cal and cultural factors. The country is currently in the midst of 
a proxy civil war between Saudi Arabia and Iran being fought 
on Yemen soil. The Saudi forces support the current Yemeni 
President Hadi, while Iran supports Houthi rebels (Asia News 
Monitor, 2018). In addition to this regional political tension 
being fought in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (IS) 
have manipulated the regional instability and established a ha-
ven for terrorist activity and deadly attacks (Asia News Monitor, 
2018). These violent quarrels exacerbate social inequality and 
increase the vulnerability of environmental management on a 
local and national scale. Instability leads to the lack of distribu-
tion of resources/public facilities, which can lead to private en-
tities taking advantage of the situation through privatization, 
public resource deprivation, and the black market. When these 
critical resources are taken away, civilians often turn to the vio-
lence out of desperation, necessity, and security. 
The tribal organization of Yemen is also infuential when 
dealing with land and water disputes, which contributes to 
regional, smaller, and more frequent spurts of violence. The 
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Sana’a Current Water Supply and Public Infrastructure
Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries, compared both to other countries in Southwest
Asia and also on a global scale. “The annual per capita availability of freshwater is 120 m³, 
which is only about 10 percent of the regional [Middle East] average” of available freshwater,
meaning Yemen’s freshwater is only 10% of the national average of other surrounding neighbor
countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman. Internationally, this water availability is "less than 2
percent of the global average" (Hales 2010: 3). Yemen also has no permanent rivers, making 
water availability continually fluctuating with the season and resultantly inconsistent.
Due to lack of available surface water, groundwater aquifers are the primary source of water for
urban areas and agricultural irrigation in Yemen, which together make up 70% of the total water
use (Al-Weshali, et al. 2015: 216). The national rate of depletion of groundwater is twice the
recharge, meaning that the groundwater supply is not being renewed at a sustainably sufficient
rate and will have significant long-term environmental consequences once the groundwater
depletes to the point of no recharge.
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Government of Yemen estimates that this type of violence “re-
sults in deaths of some 4,000 people each year,” and probably 
contributes to “more [fatalities] than the secessionist violence 
in the south, the armed rebellion in the north, and Yemeni al-
Qaeda terrorism combined” (Hales, 2010, p. 2). These conficts 
have historically catalyzed collective, more organized violence, 
threatening stability in the greater public arena. In the context 
of Yemen urban areas, especially areas where new land devel-
opments are taking place, “disputes over ownership of, or ac-
cess to, natural resources such as land and water” have become 
the “most prevalent type of social violence” (Hales,  2010, p. 2). 
The confict over water is strongly associated with land issues, 
due to control over sources of surface water and particular 
territory that accesses upstream water. “Dam construction... 
channel ‘improvements’” and other man-made alterations of 
the water infrastructure can “interfere with delicate social bal-
ances” due to the fragility of the diverse communities and their 
interrelationships (Hales, 2010, p. 3). Pre-existing environmen-
tal conditions like low levels of rainfall and lack of permanent 
rivers intensify these concerns even further. 
However, due to the increase in groundwater withdrawal over 
the last thirty years, access to the underground aquifer has 
become a more critical territorial resource. Property owners, 
including domestic, industrial, and agriculture users, have con-
tinued to dig deeper wells in order to ensure their own share 
of the aquifer’s water (Al-Hamdi, 2000). Yemen’s constitution 
“declares all natural resources to be a state property” but “the 
absence of a detailed legal framework, the lack of proper insti-
tutional setup to administer and manage water resources, and 
the weak capacity of the government to implement and en-
force water-related policies”prevent further action from being 
taken (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 72). This has contributed to a confict 
“among well owners drawing water from the same aquifer... 
lead[ing] to a ‘race to the bottom,’” contributing to rapid land 
subsistence and threatening the potential for renewable re-
charge of the aquifer (Hales, 2010, p. 4). These factors related 
to competition and confict over water resources are further 
detailed in Table 1 below. These cumulative factors, including a 
weak political system and a tribal social organization, constant 
regional violence, and arid climatic conditions make Yemen’s 
current situation “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world” 
(Asia News Monitor 2018), the United Nations claims. 
Sana’a Current Water Supply and Public Infrastructure 
Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries, compared 
both to other countries in Southwest Asia and also on a global 
scale. “The annual per capita availability of freshwater is 120 
m³, which is only about 10 percent of the regional [Middle 
East] average” of available freshwater, meaning Yemen’s fresh-
water is only 10% of the national average of other surrounding 
neighbor countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman. Internation-
ally, this water availability is “less than 2 percent of the global 
average” (Hales, 2010, p. 3). Yemen also has no permanent riv-
ers, making water availability continually fuctuating with the 
season and resultantly inconsistent. 
Due to lack of available surface water, groundwater aquifers 
are the primary source of water for urban areas and agricultural 
irrigation in Yemen, which together make up 70% of the total 
water use (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015:, p. 216). The national rate of 
depletion of groundwater is twice the recharge, meaning that 
Table 1: Factors transforming
water competition into confict.
(Hales, Muggah & LeBrun, 2010) 
Factor Explanation
Predictability
of flow
More predictable flow creates the conditions for consensus about resource
management; spate events give rise to intense stress and conflict.
Number of
users
Large shared systems generate more potential for stress as individual
control diminishes.
Visibility Surface water flows are easier to measure and manage, but being visible
may quickly give rise to conflict; groundwater sources are not.
‘Symmetry of cause
and effect’
More direct competition between individuals is more likely to trigger conflict
than, for example, depletion of groundwater affecting a broad community.
Power relations Large power imbalances between winners and losers tend to mitigate
conflicts.
External interference The state, donors, and others can trigger conflict when they interfere with
existing water management practices or ignore the management and
maintenance implications of new infrastructure projects.
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Figure 2: A woman carries jerrycans to fll with water from a
charity tap in Sana'a. (CCTV/Facebook; source: https://www. 
middleeastmonitor.com/20171121-2-5m-lack-access-to-fresh-
clean-water-in-yemen-says-red-cross/) 
the groundwater supply is not being renewed at a sustainably 
sufcient rate and will have signifcant long-term environmen-
tal consequences once the groundwater depletes to the point 
of no recharge. 
Yemen established a domestic infrastructure to aid water 
management by founding the National Water Resources Au-
thority (NWRA), the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, and 
the Ministry of Electricity and Water (Al-Hamdi, 200, p.  3-4). In 
2002, the Sana’a Water Basin was “designated as one of the fve 
critical basins” within Yemen. The National Water Resources 
Authority even established a Sana’a Branch in 2003 to directly 
implement water resources management for the Sana’a Basin 
region (JICA, 2007, p. 1). Although the establishment of these 
government-backed water and water-associated institutions 
was a great improvement for Yemen’s water infrastructure, 
their execution is limited and generally unsuccessful. These 
companies “only supply some households in the major cities 
and 70% of Yemenis live in rural areas” (Whitehead, 2015); how-
ever, with a growing global trend towards urbanization, these 
demographics will shift towards growing urban populations. 
Insecurity is even more magnifed in Sana’a, the country’s capital
city and the most stressed water basin in the country. Because
of the lack of surface water, the basin’s reliance on groundwater
(especially in the last several decades) has increased exponen-
tially. The city’s growing population places extra strain on the
water supply, with a predicted basin population of 6.06 million
by 2025 (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 4). The Tawilah aquifer provides all
water needs for the Sana’a basin. Water usage in the city in-
creased rapidly “after the identifcation of the Tawilah aquifer
in 1972 and the establishment of the NWRA” (Al-Hamdi, 2000,
p. 6). This trend was illustrated by the following; “the number
of wells in the basin went up from a few hundred in 1973 to
around 6000 wells in 2001, and 8000 wells in 2009... the water
balance of the Sana’a Basin indicates [extractions] to be fve
times higher than recharge” (Al-Weshali, et al., 2015, p. 221). If
the region continues to extract water at a constant rate, pre-
dictions state that the “total usable storage would be depleted
within 32 years” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 5).
This dramatic and concerning reality in Sana’a, due to the public
infrastructure’s fnancial limitations, lack of sufcient water sup-
ply, and the high demand for a water municipal system within
the urban area, have led the National Water and Sanitation Au-
thority and other government agencies to agree to provide an
“intermittent” water system to “maximize its coverage and im-
plement a policy of equitable access to water” (Al-Hamdi, 2000,
p. 30). However, even with these eforts towards improvement,
only 40-50% of houses in Sana’a are connected to the public
water supply (Al-Hamdi, 2000). The existing pipe network is es-
timated to lose up to 60% of the water due to leaks (Whitehead,
2015), and the “systematic low pressure in the system..and the
local topography” contribute to a system that fails to accom-
plish its goal of equally supplying every part of each zone of
the city (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 30). The weak central government
in Yemen prevents any substantial improvement of urban water
management, infrastructure, or policy.
Consequently, the city is reliant on private suppliers to provide
the remaining water demand. The most common and pre-
dominant form of private water is “tanker supplies.” The pro-
cess consists of a tank owner, who is also the middleman and
proft-maker, purchasing water from a well-owner. The tank
owner sells the water for a much higher price, which is often de-
fended by “the high cost of operation and maintenance of the
truck and... the long hours of waiting to sell a tanker load” (Al-
Hamdi, 2000, p. 30). The water is stored in household ground
tanks to “bridge the unreliable 24 hour-cycle supply,” although
this water is presumed by consumers’ to be “poor contaminated
quality,” creating yet another commercial opportunity for clean
drinking water in Sana’a (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 30).
In the Sana’a basin, the agricultural sector produces Khat,
grapes, and vegetables, all of which require intensive irriga-
tion, using 85% of the groundwater extraction in this specifc
water basin of Yemen (Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 221). Many Khat
farmers use “expensive pipes and plastic tubes” to direct water
from the underground aquifer to the Earth’s surface, rather than
earthen channels (Al-Hamdi 2000: 100). The farmer’s expensive
investments in more advanced and intensive infrastructure are
“driven by the limited supply” given many shareholders may all
be extracting water from a single well. Farmers justify this more
“extensive use of pipes” by claiming to “minimize conveyance
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losses associated with the use of earthen channels” (Al-Hamdi,
2000, p. 100).
Additionally, Sana’a’s geography and environmental conditions
pose challenges for water management. The city is located
2,300 meters above sea level, which complicates getting access
to water from rural places considering Yemen’s poor infrastruc-
ture and difcult geography (Hovden, 2015). William Cosgrove,
a Middle East water resources expert and former World Bank
specialist, claims that Sana’s problems are more complicated
than just an aquifer running out of water, “but also that the city
is hundreds of kilometres from the sea and has no alternative
water supply” (Mis, 2015). This geographic landlock puts the
city at odds to fnd creative solutions to water scarcity.
Incorporating Global Water Management in Sana’a 
Global water management schemes often target developing na-
tions with extreme water insecurity. In this case, Sana’a received
funding from the World Bank to “solve the groundwater problem
in agriculture,” also known as the Sana’a Basin Water Manage-
ment Program (Ward, 2015, p. 98). By signing onto this project in
2003, Yemen “committed itself to a long-term process [to transi-
tion to] Integrated Water Resource Management” (Ward 2015:
98), an intersectional phenomenon of water management and
globalization being pushed by many intergovernmental organi-
zations, especially the World Bank. By signing onto this program,
Yemen is taking substantial strides towards becoming a more
globalized and incorporated city, for better or for worse.
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) is touted as 
“arguably the most infuential global paradigm in water gov-
ernance” (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440). The program views 
“fragmented and disjointed” water management through sec-
tor agencies as the major barrier preventing sustainable water 
governance. IWRM acknowledges and incorporates “underly-
ing social and environmental drivers of change in planning” 
which infuence water sectors, such as agriculture, energy, 
industry, municipal supply, and ecosystem management and 
preservation (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440). The three pillars 
of sustainability, including social equity, economic growth, and 
the environment, are incorporated into the IWRM strategy. Crit-
ics of IWRM argue that these concepts are intertwined with de-
bates regarding “public versus private governance” and water 
as a commodity versus public good and human right (Newig & 
Challies, 2013, p. 440). The overall global consensus regarding 
IWRM is that its impacts are “at best marginal,” with a recorded 
20 out of 95 countries reporting “formal implementation” of its 
principles (Newig & Challies, 2013, p. 440). 
The Sana’a Basin Water Management Program was budgeted
and fnanced for a full 15-year implementation. Phase 1, which
included testing technology, analyzing supply and demand ap-
proaches to management, and organizational infrastructure,
lasted from 2003-2010. After this phase in the program, the
national governance began to plan for and implement the pro-
gram by setting up political infrastructure, assessing and moni-
toring water resources, managing public awareness campaigns,
and implementing measures for regulation (Ward,  2015).
Particularly regarding infrastructure, eforts towards enhanc-
ing water supply included improving structures for ground-
water recharge, education on sustainable water management 
and improving the efciency of water usage within agricultural 
“Water Users Associations,” and investing in better technol-
ogy like regional water pipelines and drip irrigation systems 
(Ward, 2015). Besides, technical support regarding water ef-
fciency and irrigation productivity were provided to farmers. 
Results proved that these strategies towards limiting water 
use pumped 40% less water yet still increased incomes by 10 
percent (Ward, 2015). This frst phase of the program, which pi-
loted IWRM approaches in Sana’a, demonstrated their success. 
Unfortunately, continuation and progress towards expanding 
the program have been put at a halt (possibly due to the po-
litical instability), which has prevented the transition to the of-
fcial “2nd and 3rd phases” (Ward, 2015), despite the expired 
15-year time frame of the program. Integrated Water Resource 
Management through the Sana’a Basin Water Management 
Program was limitedly successful in its preliminary eforts, but 
its lack of complete execution leaves Sana’a in an interim and 
uncompleted status of development. 
Groundwater Contamination in Sana’a 
Sana’a is faced with issues of water scarcity, distribution, and 
contamination regarding surface and groundwater. The latter 
issue is one that directly threatens all water resources, both 
above and below ground, which the urban area of Sana’a is 
reliant on. This is in large part due to the poor or completely 
lacking public waste infrastructure in Sana’a. It is not simple 
to “remediate” or re-clean water to its original state once it has 
been polluted. The consequences of contaminated water are 
far-reaching, creating “health problems for human beings and 
animals, deterioration of farmland (e.g. lowering the yields of 
crops), and adverse impact on the environment” (JICA, 200, p.: 
13). Water contamination is even more threatening in devel-
oping countries, as “outbreaks of waterborne diseases usually 
associated with gastrointestinal symptoms and increasing car-
cinogenicity created by certain organic chemicals” enters the 
main water supply, having widespread implications in public 
and environmental health (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 52). 
Sana’a’s current waste management is limited and poorly run; 
a public sewage system covers 29% of the population in urban 
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areas. This sewage system utilizes a wastewater treatment fa-
cility, which “drained directly to an open channel.”Unfortunate-
ly, many uneducated farmers use this waste discharge for ir-
rigation purposes, which poses a health risk and threatens the 
produce and fresh vegetables grown for Sana’a’s urban popu-
lation. As a consequence, the National Water and Resource Au-
thority of Sana’a Basin has “started to raise awareness among 
farmers not to use the drained water.” Unused water has “infl-
trated into the ground...and the quality of groundwater down-
stream of the treatment plant has become worse” (JICA, 2007, 
p. 3). Domestic wastewater can also contaminate groundwater 
through “widespread use of on-site disposal facilities, leakage 
from sewer lines or infltration from treatment facilities such as 
oxidation ponds” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 50). 
Approximately 75% of the population does not reach the pub-
lic sewage network and relies on the cesspit, an underground 
pit that holds liquid waste and sewage, as their primary form 
of waste disposal (Al-Hamdi ,2000:, p.50). In the case of heavy 
rain fow, rainwater overfows the cesspit and spreads con-
taminated water in previously clean areas. Cesspits have also 
proven to pollute the groundwater by infltration through the 
soil, which threatens the safety and hygiene of the entire reli-
able water supply that Sana’a depends on. In Sana’a, “several 
hundred private wells” were proven to be afected by sewage 
contamination (JICA, 200, p. 12). This contaminated water in 
Sana’a’s central inner city area has a nitrate concentration two 
to three times higher than the “permissible limit for drinking 
water” according to the World Health Organization’s health 
standards (JICA, 2007, p. 13). Cesspits also threaten to disturb 
the pre-existing National Water and Sanitation Authority dis-
tribution network of sewage, particularly in identifable areas 
more vulnerable to cesspit clogging and collection of waste-
water in ponds (Al-Hamdi, 2000). 
There is also concern regarding inadequate waste disposal in 
petrol stations, car service shops, medical units, and industry, 
mostly due to the lack of wastewater treatment facilities for 
these establishments. The disposal of wastewater from these 
sites is assumed to be uncontrolled, unregulated, and within 
the discretion of individual stakeholders (JICA, 2007, p. 13). 
This potential contamination poses a public health risk for 
those exposed to or in proximity to these establishments. 
Government Subsidies and Limited Groundwater Supply 
The Yemen government has little control over managing the ex-
traction of groundwater. Government policy incentives, such as
diesel subsidies, encourage well extraction, efectively stimulat-
ing inefcient and unsustainable water use for irrigation. These
incentives are still prevalent and continue to magnify the con-
sequences of poor water management (Al-Weshali et al., 2015).
Due to the Yemen government subsidization of fuel, private in-
terests cheaply power water pumps (causing it to over-extract) 
and make a proft by selling it privately. Private entities drill 
new unregulated wells geographically near public ones, which 
threatens the groundwater supply and creates a privatized 
black market for water resources (Hovden, 2015). These private 
agencies are also well aware that the public infrastructure in 
Yemen is not able to support itself and its reinforcement and 
maintenance is lacking or non-existent. These private compa-
nies can manipulate the water prices due to their monopoly 
over the scarce resource and overcharge the impoverished and 
desperate urban Yemeni community. 
The Yemen government has also placed a fnancial subsidy on 
“imported grains” which has pushed out the grain industry and 
creates a national reliance on outsourced cereal crops. This 
shift in cropping pattern has led to the more intensive cultiva-
tion of “water-demanding cash crops, particularly Khat, grapes, 
and vegetables” which depletes the domestic water supply 
faster than grain crops (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 109). This import 
subsidy also lowered the national market price of cereals in Ye-
men, resulting in grain cultivation that “covers less than 5% of 
the agricultural land in the basin” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 85). 
Environmental Consequences of Khat Addiction 
Although there are natural constraints based on Yemen’s geog-
raphy and physical environment, other factors such as cultural 
norms, government behaviors, political unrest, and policy de-
cisions are escalating and magnifying the water shortage. The 
widespread habit of chewing low-stimulant “khat” is just one of 
these factors contributing to water scarcity in Sana’a (Hovden,
2015). The drug is a “full-blown national addiction” with “90% 
of men and 25% of women regularly chewing the leaves” (But-
ters, 2015). Chewing khat is considered the country’s primary 
form of socializing, given that the predominantly Muslim pop-
ulation is banned from consuming standard drugs or alcohol. 
Culturally, Khat infuences the Yemeni population in several 
ways. It encourages “complacency” about the government fail-
ings. Furthermore, Khat contributes to an unproductive work 
environment because it “keeps the country awake,” which en-
forces staying up late and sleeping in, and pushes establish-
ments to open much later in the day (Butters, 2009). The ef-
fects of Khat delays the urgency that must be ignited to create 
widespread societal change. It also leads to exclusionary “khat 
ceremonies” which reinforces gender inequality. On the other 
hand, it can also be attributed to keeping people calm during 
situations of crisis, which happen quite frequently during a Civ-
il War, and also “keeping them of the streets” (Butters, 2009). 
These unintended consequences of heavy Khat use could be 
a signifcant reason why the country is struggling in so many 
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ways, and staying away from the substance might be part of 
the solution towards shaping a positive future for Yemen. 
A regular user’s daily dose of Khat costs approximately fve 
US dollars. Considering the extreme poverty and other more 
pressing needs of the growing population, it is quite astound-
ing that so much of the population is still consistently purchas-
ing and chewing khat. Most families spend more money on 
Khat than on food (Butters, 2009). The Khat market demand 
allows for cultivator’s to spend excessive amounts of valuable 
water to grow the plant, and the profts make it worthwhile 
for the farmers. The standard “annual income of a Qat [Khat] 
farmer...is more than twice the national average of per capita 
income” (Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 223) and “certainly provides 
a steadier income than growing vegetables” (Butters 2009). Be-
cause this habit is widespread in Yemeni culture, its usage is 
uncontrolled and continually provides demand in the market. 
Growing Khat, “a shrub whose young leaves contain a com-
pound with efects similar to those of amphetamines,” requires 
intensive and routine irrigation (Butters, 2009). The Sana’a Ba-
sin is environmentally optimal conditions for Khat cultivation. 
“The plant thrives in the high hill country” and “is easy to grow 
and harvest.”To cultivate Khat felds successfully, they must be 
“fooded twice a month” and consequently consume approxi-
mately 30% of the national water supply (Butters, 2009). These 
agricultural techniques are sucking the limited water from 
Sana’a’s Basin which could be used in other capacities to maxi-
mize the utility of the precious resource. 
According to Al-Weshali et. al.’s article Diesel Subsidies and Ye-
men Politics: Post-2011 crises and their impact on groundwater
use and agriculture, around “85% of [national] khat production
comes from fve governorates located only in the highlands
region of the country” including Sana’a’s greater water basin
(Al-Weshali et al., 2015, p. 223). Khat agriculture “is estimated to
cover around 1/3 of the total area” in Sana’a” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p.
5). Groundwater extraction for Khat cultivation is often shared or
split between many shareholders invested in one well. Although
this “network of shareholding” may clash with the regional “trib-
al structures” which shape the social landscape, the possibility
for “improve[d] awareness and facilitat[ed] collective action to
reduce water abstraction” are potential areas of improvement
regarding sustainable groundwater management (Al-Hamdi,
2000, p. 107). A hydrologist and local director of a German tech-
nical-assistance advising team for water management,  argues
that on a national level, quitting khat would double the amount
of household water available, a remarkable potential improve-
ment given the already-threatened water supply (Butters, 2009).
The national Khat addiction feeds into the increasing water 
scarcity in the region due to its high demand and costly irri-
gation requirement. The drug limits educational initiative to 
change the way things are in Yemen - and helps people men-
tally cope with their often violent or impoverished surround-
ings. Nonetheless, this tradition is creating widespread com-
placency for societal issues, creating a norm of unproductivity 
and unmotivation which hinders change, while also prioritiz-
ing water to go towards Khat irrigation instead of more neces-
sary social needs like running water and food. 
Looking Forward, Possible Solutions 
Future water supply options for Sana’a will be organized into 
two categories, either in-basin water resources or out-of-basin 
alternatives. Regardless, Yemen’s national government should 
clearly defne water ownership and water use rights. This could 
be achieved through the “establishment and enforcement of 
both boundary and authority rules,” which would clarify and 
identify access to groundwater (by halting the continuous 
increase in pumpers taking from the aquifer). Establishing au-
thority rules would “reinforce [the political] boundary” and its 
scope in Yemeni society (Al-Hamdi, 2000). 
Some in-basin options include “enhance[d] utilization of rain-
water, intra-basin transfer... reallocation of water from agri-
culture to municipal use, and utilization of unconventional 
water resources” through wastewater reuse (Al-Hamdi, 2000, 
p. 45). Another proposed solution to addressing Sana’a’s water 
crisis is for the local municipality to purchase well-water that 
would’ve gone towards agriculture or private companies. This 
would be a cheaper alternative compared to shipping water 
in from abroad. However, it would require political reform and 
changes to Yemen’s constitution (Whitehead, 2015). 
Out-of-basin or “imported water” options consist of inter-basin 
or regional transfers of surface water from various sources such 
as Surdud, Marib, or the Red Sea (Al-Hamdi, 2000). However, 
developing the infrastructure to execute this and the costs as-
sociated with inter-basin water transfer “face high costs that 
range from 1.7 to 6.4 times higher than the current expensive 
option of private tanker supply” (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 45). Spe-
cifcally regarding out-of-basin alternatives, “political, social, 
legal and technical” barriers should also be taken into account. 
Public education to promote lower water use in farming com-
munities could also help reduce the risk of water insecurity in 
the future. “Better agricultural extension, introduction of wa-
ter-saving technology, and information assistance to shift to 
other crops” are all valid and productive ways to reduce water 
use. Eventually, the Yemen government should “seek to invest 
in an alternative economic base” rather than relying on the cur-
rent water-based economy (Al-Hamdi, 2000, p. 107). 
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Yemen has immense disadvantages. It is in a region of the 
world facing geopolitical confict, lack of government control, 
and growing populations. These factors magnify the pre-exist-
ing regional water scarcity, which is impacting every country in 
the Middle East, but particularly Yemen. The capital of Yemen, 
Sana’a, is one mega-urban area threatened by water insecurity. 
Sana’a is currently reliant on a groundwater aquifer which is 
rapidly depleting and becoming contaminated. Cultural fac-
tors, such as tribal organization and national addiction to Khat, 
prevent policy initiatives from successfully mitigating future 
water shortages and obstacles. On a global scale, Yemen is a 
country in dire need of international support and guidance. 
While these issues facing Sana’a threaten regional stability, it 
also serves as an opportunity for potential productive change 
through positive Yemeni leadership and outside actors to help 
Yemen out of its humanitarian crisis. 
… 
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